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NOTES
Esthetic Zoning., The Trend of
the Law
Recent years have witnessed increasing attention to the problem of
esthetic zoning. The word "zoning" is defined as: "governmental regulations of the uses of land and buildings according to districts and
zones."1 The word "esthetic" (or aesthetic) has been defined as: "of or
pertaining to the beautiful, as distinguished from the merely pleasing,
the moral and especially the useful. ... "2 Thus a working definition of
the phrase "esthetic zoning" would be: the regulation of the use of property for the purpose of preserving or attaining beauty.
The mid-twentieth century has brought forth two great problems of
urban living- the need to regulate the expansion of the suburbs and
the necessity of urban redevelopment in older areas with the accent on
slum dearance. The key to these problems is planning.3 Planning is a
more comprehensive term than zoning, having its emphasis on a positive
approach to the development of an area -e.g., laying out parks, roads,
hospitals, etc. Zoning, on the other hand, is, in essence, negative, having
its emphasis on preventing certain uses of land. Zoning, while thus being an adjunct of planning, is also the very crux of it, since without zoning, attempts at city planning would be unenforceable.
Contemporary concepts of planning a community have necessarily had
MuNICIPAL CoRPoRATIoNs § 25.01 (3rd ed. 1950).
2McQUILLIN,
2
WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1955).

' See NOTE, 7 WEST. RES. L. REV. 87.
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to embrace esthetic zoning, because there is no doubt that a comprehensive community plan has as one of its objectives the creation of an attractive city. Such programs involving esthetic considerations may indude ordinances permitting esthetic zoning. The purpose of this article
is to ascertain to what extent the courts have permitted the various legislative bodies to zone esthetically.
ZONING As AN EXERCISE OF THE POLICE POWER

Due process of law protects private property from being unduly restricted or taken away from its owner unless the welfare of society warrants this interference. The power of any government to take away or
regulate the use of private property is within its police power. The police power is the inherent power of any government to prescribe regulations for the public health, comfort, morals, safety, and general welfare
of its citizens. If this power is used to enhance the general welfare, it
may regulate or acquire private property, since the welfare of the individual is subordinated to the good of all. A valid, reasonable use of the
power satisfies the due process requirement. Therefore, as long as any
ordinance reasonably tends to promote the health, comfort, morals, safety
and general welfare of its citizens, it is a valid exercise of the police
power.
Zoning has been held to be within the police power. 4 If a community
attempts through zoning to keep residential sections free from the effects of
industry, for example, there is no doubt that this act pertains to the health,
safety and general welfare of the citizens.5 Nevertheless, such laws must
be reasonable in their application and are thus subject to review by the
courts to determine if the general welfare of the community is being advanced, 6 or whether due process of law is being denied.7 For example.
'Village of Euclid v. Ambler, 272 U.S. 365 (1926). See also Valley View Village
v. Proffett, 221 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1955) in which the federal court stated that the
Home-Rule Provision of the Ohio Constitution was self-executing and no enabling
legislation was necessary for a local government to have the power of zoning, since
zoning was held to be a power of local self government under the Home-Rule Provision.
'State v. Kievman, 116 Conn. 458, 165 Atl. 601 (1933); State v. New Orleans, 154
La. 271, 97 So. 440 (1923); St. Louis v. Friedman, 358 Mo. 681, 216 S.W.2d 475
(1948); Pritz v. Messer, 112 Ohio St. 628, 149 N.E. 30 (1925); Price v. Schwafel,
92 Cal. App.2d 77, 206 P.2d 683 (1949).
'Village of Euclid v. Ambler, 272 U.S. 365 (1926); River Forest State Bank v.
Village of Hillside, 129 N.E.2d 171 (Ill. 1955); Trust Co. of Chicago v. Chicago,
408 Ill. 91, 96 N.E.2d 499 (1951); State v. Miller, 129 N.E.2d 209 (Ohio App.
1955); Henie v. City of Euclid, 97 Ohio App. 258, 118 N.E.2d 682 (1954); Cleveland Trust Co. v. Village of Brooklyn, 92 Ohio App. 351, 110 N.E.2d 440 (1952);
Murdock v. City of Norwood, 3 Ohio Supp. 278 (1937).
"State v. Joseph, 139 Ohio St. 229, 39 N.E.2d 515 (1942).
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trying to restrict an obviously commercial sector to residential housing
would not be enhancing the general welfare.8 Attempts to spot zone a
community have also been held unconstitutional as being a deprivation
of property without due process of law.9 One court has held that the
test of validity, when applied to certain land, must be that the zoning restriction qualifies at its inception under the police power, not that it
qualify in the future.'0
THE GENERAL RuLE
As long as zoning laws contained only rudimentary features, such as
provisions preventing industry from moving into a residential neighborhood, they were constitutional exercises of the police power. Difficulty
arose, however, when zoning began to embrace esthetic considerations.
The Ohio courts followed the general rule when they said that "mere
esthetic considerations are not sufficient to restrict the use of property
so as to interfere with private uses." Many courts, however, have held that
if the primary purpose of the zoning ordinance can be included under
one of the recognized purposes of the police power, then esthetic factors
may be included as a secondary purpose.1
The courts have ruled that esthetics alone are not essential to public
health, welfare, etc.'s Several reasons can be listed to explain the courts'
reluctance to hold beautification in and of itself to be a valid exercise of
the police power. In the first place, the courts are faced with the prob8

Henie v. City of Euclid, 97 Ohio App. 258, 118 N.E.2d 682 (1954).
Youngstown v. Kahn Bros., 112 Ohio S. 654, 148 N.E. 842 (1925); State v.
Woodworth, 33 Ohio App. 406, 169 N.E. 713 (1929). Spot zoning refers to a
zoning ordinance which zones only parts of a city and leaves the remainder unrestricted.
" Gust v. Township of Canton, 342 Mich. 436, 70 N.W.2d 772 (1955).
'Cleveland Trust Co. v. Village of Brooklyn, 92 Ohio App. 351, 110 N.E.2d 440
(1952). See also Hailer Sign Works v. Physical Culture Training School, 249 Ill.
436, 94 N.E. 920 (1911); Hitchman v. Oakland Township, 329 Mich. 331, 45
N.W.2d 306 (1951); State v. Russell, 162 Ohio St. 281, 123 N.E.2d 261 (1954);
Wondrak v. Kelley, 129 Ohio St. 268, 195 N.E. 65 (1935); Youngstown v. Kahn
Bros., 112 Ohio St. 654, 148 N.E. 842 (1925); Appeal of Lord, 369 Pa. 121, 81
A.2d 533 (1951); State v. Woodworth, 33 Ohio App. 406, 169 N.E. 713 (1929);
Murdock v. City of Norwood, 3 Ohio Supp. 278 (1937).
"Murphy, Inc. v. Westport, 131 Conn. 292, 40 A.2d 177 (1944); State v. Kievman,
116 Conn. 458, 165 At. 601 (1933); Chicago Park District v. Canfield, 370 111.
447, 19 N.E.2d 376 (1939); General Outdoor Adv. Co. v. Indianapolis Dep't. of
Public Works, 220 Ind. 85, 172 N.E. 309 (1930); Barney & Casey Co. v. Town of
Milton, 324 Mass. 440, 87 N.E.2d 9 (1949); 122 Main Street Corp. v. City of
Brocton, 323 Mass. 646, 84 N.E.2d 13 (1949); St. Louis v. Freidman, 358 Mo. 681,
216 S.W.2d 475 (1948); West Bros. Brick Co. v. Alexandria, 169 Va. 271, 192
S.E. 881 (1937).
9
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ler of defining beauty. An object of beauty to one man might be considered ugly by another. Secondly, the courts have hesitated to set precedent in the dear cases because of cases of a more difficult nature which
may arise. Not to be forgotten also is the long tradition in the United
States which lays stress on the maximum freedom in the use of one's property with a minimum of restrictions imposed upon it by a legislative
body.14 These are perhaps the real underlying reasons which have motivated the courts to try to find some other justification under the police
power to uphold an esthetic zoning ordinance.
THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL RULE

In some cases the courts have readily found enough traditional justifications under the police power to uphold ordinances whose chief objectives appeared to be esthetic. Foremost in this classification have been
cases involving the regulation or prohibition of commercial signs' 5 and
billboards.
8
Billboards have long been held to be a valid subject of regulations.'
When a community banned billboards altogether, the question arose
whether the right to erect a billboard is a right incidental to the ownership of land. If it were, then condemnation proceedings would be necessary since the use of property cannot be unreasonably limited without due
process of law.'7 If it were not, a simple ordinance banning them without compensation would suffice because the ordinance would be a valid
exercise of the police power.' 8
Keeping billboards out of residential districts was justified on the
grounds that billboards were fire hazards and convenient places for thieves
to lie in wait for unsuspecting passers-by.' 9 Despite this justification under the traditional concepts of the police power, the regulation of bill'Youngstown v. Kahn Bros., 112 Ohio St. 654, 148 N.E. 842 (1925). See also
Hitchman v. Oakland Township, 329 Mich. 331, 45 N.W.2d 306 (1951); Borough
of Mt. Pleasant v. Point Pleasant Pavillion, 3 N.J.S. 222, 66 A.2d 40 (1949); Northport v. Carll, 133 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1954).
1441 A.B.A.J. 501.
'Murphy, Inc. v. Westport, 131 Conn. 292, 40 A.2d 177 (1944); General Outdoor
Adv. Co. v. Dep't. of Public Works, 289 Mass. 149, 193 N.E. 799 (1935); Criterion
Service v. City of East Cleveland, 88 N.E.2d 300 (Ohio App. 1949).
' 8 Thomas Cusack Co. v. Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917).
7
O'Mealia Outdoor Adv. Co. v. Mayor and Council of Borough of Rutherford, 128
N.J.L. 587, 27 A.2d 863 (1942).
'Mid-State Advertising Corporation v. Bond, 274 N.Y. 82, 8 N.E.2d 286 (1937)
(dissenting opinion).
19
Thomnas Cusack Co. v. Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917).
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boards is probably more concerned with esthetics than with safety 20 This
is indicated by the regulation of billboards in the vicinity of public parks.
Protecting the beauty of public parks and their immediate surroundings is a purely esthetic matter, although the courts have found various
reasons for preserving an unblemished view for the spectator. One court
held that esthetic zoning was a valid exercise of the police power in this
instance because parks were set aside for recreational purposes, and the
health and welfare of the people was advanced by the unblemished view
of these public places and the surrounding area. 21 Another court stated
that parks are maintained for their beauty and that it is one thing to zone
esthetically for the over-all planning of private property, and quite an22
other thing to enhance the beauty of a park, since it is a public place.
Other courts have not been so hesitant in upholding apparently esthetically grounded ordinances dealing with signs and billboards. A New
York court has said:
This court is not restricted to aesthetic reasons in deciding to sustain
the validity of the ordinance in question, but if it wer& so restricted, it
would not hesitate to sustain the legislation upon that ground alone. The
court cannot believe that, with the legislature of the state specifically
delegating the power to regulate or prohibit signs in the public streets, a
municipal board in this day and age can be so restricted, as plaintiff contends, in thus promoting the happiness and general welfare of the community.,

The court quoted with approval a dissenting opinion of the New York
24
Court of Appeals which had urged the same view.
A lower Pennsylvania court has also recognized the esthetic zoning of
billboards. The court held that billboards and signs could be banned
from a certain street which the city of Harrisburg was trying to beautify.
The judge said:
This ordinance recited both the aesthetic and utilitarian reasons for
abating nuisances and hazards of signs, and perhaps we need not go further
than to couple the two together and base our opinion on the middle of the
road cases which like Welch v. Swasey? and Ligget's Petition hold that
if the exercise of the police power is based upon any reason of public
Hailer Sign Works v. Physical Culture Training School, 249 Ill. 436, 94 N.E. 920
(1911); Commonwealth v. Earl R. Trimmer, 53 Dauphin County Rep. 91 (Pa.
1942).
'General Outdoor Adv. Co. v. Indianapolis Dep'r. of Public Works, 220 Ind. 85,
172 N.E. 309 (1930).
'Chicago Park District v. Canfield, 370 IMI.447, 19 NE.2d 376 (1939).
'Preferred Tires, Inc. v. Village of Hempstead, 19 N.Y.S.2d 374, 377 (1940).
"-bMid-State Advertising Corporation v. Bond, 274 N.Y. 82, 8 N.E.2d 286 (1937)
(dissenting opinion).
m193 Mass. 364, 79 N.E. 745 (1907), affl'd., 214 U.S. 91 (1909).
:291 Pa. 109, 139 Ad. 619 (1927).
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safety or prosperity, the fact that considerations of an aesthetic nature
also enter into the reason for the regulation will not render it invalid.
we definitely hold also, in the light of the foregoing later decisions,
aesthetic considerations alone, in this day are sufficient upon which to
an exercise of the police powerY
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Other inroads on the general rule may be found. The use of vacant
lots in a residential area is one. Although the Ohio courts have emphatically rejected esthetic zoning as such, a court of appeals has upheld
the constitutionality of an ordinance which required strict compliance
with rules for the removal of top soil from vacant land.28 More significandy, the Ohio court seemed to be citing favorably a Massachusetts case
which resulted in the prohibition of the removal of any top soil from
certain vacant land.29 Esthetic zoning would appear to be one of the
prime considerations in an absolute prohibition of the removal of top soil.
Another exception to the general rule is the preservation of places of
historical interest, such as an old section of a city. Preserving these historical places has been held to be in the public interest, and has been
treated similarly to the park cases. 30 If, for example, someone desired to
erect a very modern structure in Williamsburg, Virginia, this writer has
little doubt that if an ordinance were in existence preventing modern
architecture, the maintenance of the historic atmosphere of that town
would be held to be in the interest of the public welfare.
THE NEW RULE

McQuillin has said that the old rule requiring some other justification
under the police power for esthetic zoning is undergoing changes. 3 ' The
transition was quite noticeable in the billboard cases, in which the courts
32
have finally upheld such regulations on esthetic considerations alone.
One court has held, for example, that zoning pertains not only to the use
of buildings, .but to their structural and architectural design as well.3 3 In
these cases, it is extremely important to ascertain whether the court is
laying down a general rule, or whether its rule, while appearing to be
quite broad, is limited to the facts of the case. When the courts say that
' Commonwealth v. Earl R. Trimmer, 53 Dauphin County Rep. 91, 105 (Pa. 1942).
'Miesz v. Mayfield Heights, 92 Ohio App. 471, 111 N.E.2d 20 (1952).
'Town of Burlington v. Dunn, 318 Mass. 216, 61 N.E.2d 243 (1945), cert. denied,
326 U.S. 739 (1945).
'City of New Orleans v. Pergament, 198 La. 852, 5 So. 2d 129 (1941).
'McQUILLIN, MUNIcIPAL CoRPoRATIoNs § 25.31 (3rd ed. 1950).
"Preferred Tires, Inc. v. Village of Hempstead, 19 N.Y.S.2d 374, 377 (1940);
Commonwealth v. Earl R. Trimmer, 53 Dauphin County Rep. 91, 105 (Pa. 1942).
'Mills v. City of Baton Rouge, 210 La. 830, 28 So.2d 447 (1946), citing Mansfield
& Swett v. Town of West Orange, 120 N.J.L. 145, 198 Ad. 225 (1938).
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they are upholding a zoning ordinance on purely esthetic grounds, do
they really mean what they say?
The Louisiana Supreme Court is often quoted as being "esthetically
minded." The following is a characteristic passage:
If by the term "aesthetic consideration" is meant a regard merely for
outward appearances, for good taste in the matter of the beauty of the
neighborhood itself, we do not observe any substantial reason for saying
that such a consideration is not a matter of general welfare. The beauty
of a fashionable residential neighborhood in a city is for the comfort and
happiness of the residents, and it sustains in a general way the value of
property in the neighborhood. Why should not the police power avail,
as well as to suppress or prevent a nuisance committed by offending the
sense of hearing or the olfactory nerves? An eyesore in a neighborhood
of residences might be as much of a public nuisance, and as ruinous to
property values in the neighborhood generally, as a disagreeable noise or
odor, or a menace to safety or health. The difference is not in principle,
but only in degree."

A reading of the case underscores the breadth of this recognition of
esthetics as a basis of zoning. The factual issue presented was whether
the city had the power through zoning to keep businesses out of residential neighborhoods. This court upheld the esthetic regulation because it
would promote the public welfare. A subsequent Louisiana case held
that it was in the interest of the general welfare to preserve the architectural beauty of a city. 5
In 1955, the United States Supreme Court decided the very important
case of Berman v. Parker.0 A large slum clearance program was inaugurated by the District of Columbia. The land was to be redeveloped by
private interests who would either buy or lease the condemned land from
the District of Columbia. There was a stipulation in the conveyance that
the redevelopment must be done in strict compliance with the plans of
the redevelopment commission. The plaintiff, an owner of a building
used strictly for business purposes challenged the right of the District of
Columbia to condemn his land since the building itself was not a substandard structure. The Supreme Court held, without a dissent, that this
was within the scope of the police power. The language of the court
leaves little doubt as to its exact meaning:
The concept of public welfare is broad and inclusive (citation omitted). The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as
well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine
that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy... . In the
present case, the Congress and its authorized agencies have made a deter"State v. New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 284, 97 So. 440, 444 (1923).
"City of New Orleans v. Pergament, 198 La. 852, 5 So.2d 129 (1941).
HoRAcK & NoLAN, LAND UsE CoNRRoLs, pp. 163-174 (1955).
*8348 U.S. 26 (1955).

See also,
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mination that takes into account a wide variety of values. It is not for us
to reappraise them. If those who govern the District of Columbia decide
that the nation's capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is
nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way. (emphasis
added)

Although this was not a zoning case, it declares that the police power extends to esthetic considerations. One writer considered this opinion of
great significance because of its effect upon our traditional concepts of
private property:
The decision seems to introduce a new era in democracy. Community
symmetry and benefits are to be substituted for individual preferences, and
the privileges of property ownership and the rights of property are to be
directed and, in a larger measure than previously, controlled by public
authority. The decision is of great political significance as well as legal

consequence.M

The legal consequences were not long in forthcoming. A zoning ordinance in Fox Point, Wisconsin required as a condition precedent to the
issuing of a building permit, a finding by the Building Board of the village that the exterior architectural appeal and functional plan of the proposed structure would not be at substantial variance with other structures
already existing in the neighborhood so as to substantially depreciate
property values. The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the ordinance on
two grounds. 39 First, the court decided that the protection of property
values was within the general welfare purpose of the police power because "anything that tends to destroy property values of the inhabitants
of the village necessarily adversely affects the general welfare of the entire village."'40 The court then pointed out that the ordinance was
grounded largely upon esthetic considerations, but that an esthetic basis
would not make the law invalid. The court noted that the old rule forbidding zoning based on esthetics alone was undergoing change. It added
that the case of Berman v. Parker4 ' has made it extremely doubtful that
the old rule is any longer the law.
The Wisconsin decision is probably the most far-reaching of any to
date in its holding on the validity of esthetic zoning. There appears little
doubt that the Wisconsin court has laid down a rule the implications of
which are far broader than the immediate fact situation which brought it
about.
87

Ibid.

41 A.B.A.J. 501, 503.
'State v. Wieland, 269 Wisc. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217 (1955),
Ct.81 (1955).
'0Id. at 222.
-"348 U.S. 26 (1955).

cert. denied, 76 Sup.

